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Thank you very much for your invitation and thanks in particular to Professor 
Lourdes Beneria, who invited me to the Critical Economic Series. 
The field of thought within Economics, or within any trend of 
interdisciplinary environmental studies, that I want to present today is called 
«Ecological economics». It’s one of many different strands of heterodox or critical 
economics: we have feminist economics, we have biophysical economics, we have 
environmental economics (but environmental economics is not a part of this), 
we have political economics, and we have institutional economics. 
What I want to focus on today is mostly ecological economics, which is my area 
of study. Interestingly, it’s a field that was developed by ecologists and economists 
coming together in the early 1980s – economists who were dissatisfied with the 
way their discipline was treating environmental problems and ecologists who felt 
that to understand environmental problems better, they should collaborate with 
social scientists and economists. This was the basic philosophy behind ecological 
economics. 
Interestingly enough, the International Society for Ecological Economics was 
founded here in Barcelona in 1987. The first meeting of the society was hosted 
by Professor Martínez Alier, who’s here today, and since then there has been a 
strong school of ecological economics here in Barcelona and in our institute 
at ICTA in Barcelona. I’m one of many other ecological economists who over 
the years have worked and published in our institute, the ICTA, which is an 
institute not of economics but of Interdisciplinary Environmental Studies – 
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so we have ecologists, conservation scientists, climatologists, economists, and 
social scientists coming together. So I want to explain a little bit about ecological 
economics. First, I have to make a distinction that is not always clear: ecological 
economics is not environmental economics. I would simply define environmental 
economics as the application of mainstream economics, neoclassical economics, 
to environmental matters, basically – although this is oversimplifying to some 
extent – treating environmental problems as a case of an externality that has not 
been internalized by the market and then searching for a range of tools from 
cost-benefit analyses to proper pricing, carbon pricing, etc. for internalizing this 
environmental damage within the market, ok? That’s environmental economics 
and that’s not what I’m talking about today. What I’m talking about is ecological 
economics, which is quite different. What are the principles of ecological 
economics? Mainstream economics and environmental economics start basically 
with a graph, familiar to you all – firms and consumers. Firms hire people, 
and then people consume and buy products from firms, right? But ecological 
economics has a very different starting point. Ecological economics starts from a 
view of the economy as a metabolic system.
What does this mean? Each of our bodies has a metabolism, right? We take in 
energy, we take in materials, we produce waste, we move around and we consume 
energy – calories. Imagine our whole body summed up as the total of society, and 
on top of that all the instruments that we use, all the infrastructure, etc. This has 
a metabolism, with energy and raw materials going into the economy and waste 
and heat and matter going out. So, ecological economics starts from the premise 
or from the point of view that the economy can be analysed, then seen and 
treated as an ecosystem, as part of the ecosystem, and, as you will understand, 
this is a very different starting point from that of standard economics. 
The most important milestone work in ecological economics was a book 
by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen who was an economist but also a physicist by 
training and a mathematician and statistician. In his book called The Entropy Law 
and the Economic Process, he basically argued that the economy is a process that 
is entropic: it takes low-entropy, well-ordered energy or matter and transforms 
it through a process of producing useful things into high-entropy, low-order, 
less concentrated forms of energy. I think the debate about the contribution of 
Georgescu-Roegen took a trivial and I would say unproductive turn as to whether 
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there are ultimate limits to the growth of the economy because of entropy. Well, 
yes, maybe there will be after a billion years, and so on. The sun will deplete itself 
or the energy of the planet will run out, there will be total entropy and then 
nothing else. But I think that trivializes the contribution of Georgescu-Roegen, 
which was much more interesting and important, especially in his book. 
In his work about entropy, he made an important distinction between stocks 
of energy and flows of energy. We can understand solar energy as a flow of energy 
and we can understand fossil fuels as a stock of energy. A stock of energy is 
a concentrated form of energy with low entropy and high order. You take it 
out, you use it and then you produce carbon emissions, which are impossible to 
recycle afterwards. So then you have a very high-entropy resource,  heat, which is 
practically lost forever, isn’t it? That was the main insight of Georgescu-Roegen, 
using physics to explain that the resources that we use, we lose them forever. 
We’re not using capital in a way that is sustainable. But then he also had a very 
interesting insight, which was that the other source of energy, which is solar 
energy, is a flow, and much less concentrated than fossil fuels. So in order to 
capture this diffuse form of energy, which is a higher-entropy resource, you have 
to use other material and you have to use more land. What we later found when 
we tried to develop, for example, solar energy on a large scale, is that this takes 
a lot of land and creates other types of problems, or uses a lot of materials. 
So, yes, there are other sources of energy but they use other energy and other 
materials in order to concentrate them because they have higher entropy to start 
with. Another key contribution of ecological economics was precisely to think of 
energy not in absolute terms but in terms of net energy. What does this mean? 
It means that in order to get energy, you have to spend energy. In order to get 
oil out of the earth, you have to use energy to extract it, to dig it up, to pay for 
the bulldozers, to hire geological engineers – and all this also consumes energy. 
In the same way, if you want to build a nuclear power plant, you have to use 
energy to build it, then treat the waste and move the waste around, etc. One key 
contribution of ecological economics, and of Howard T. Odum in particular, 
was to put the emphasis on how much net energy we are getting out of energy 
resources and to affirm that this net energy that we drew, especially from fossil 
fuels, at the beginning of capitalism and the Industrial Revolution, was crucial for 
the type of gains in labour productivity that we achieved, because we got a huge 
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surplus of net energy from these stored, low-entropy fossil fuels in the ground. I 
have three other arguments to present the theoretical framework needed to make 
sense of what I’m going to say about growth: in the context of the mainstream 
framework there would be many more objections but this is the framework I will 
use to position my argument about growth. 
Another key argument of ecological economists is that services which on the 
surface might seem not to be using too much energy, actually embody a lot of 
energy. In order to produce services, you embody the hierarchy of a lot of energy. 
I mean you need food to feed the service workers, and you need materials to 
make the computers providing these services work.
It’s the same as an ecosystem hierarchy. If you have a fish at the top of the 
ecosystem scale, below you have the phytoplankton which absorb sun and you 
keep going down the scale. The fish at the top of the food scale embodies a lot 
of energy that gets taken in below. In a similar vein, think of the service worker 
embodying a huge pyramid of energy below, so it might seem that material lies 
at the top of the pyramid but it takes a lot of energy to enable this worker to be 
a service worker at the top of the pyramid. 
Unlike environmental economics (where externalities are thought of as 
something outside of the market, assuming that markets can internalize them, 
so we can have pricing instruments in markets and internalize carbon-emission 
damage), ecological economics starts from a very different premise, namely that 
externalities are ever-present: they are ubiquitous, they are unavoidable and, in a 
sense, they are cost-shifting successes, in the words of K. William Kapp, a proto-
ecological institutional economist. 
To give an example of this, I read recently a book by Raj Patel, The Value of 
Nothing, where he makes this interesting point: «Take a McDonald’s hamburger. 
If you were trying to internalize all the damage that is being caused to produce a 
McDonald’s hamburger, it would cost 150 dollars». He makes a rough calculation. 
Obviously, a McDonald’s hamburger cannot cost 150 dollars because it will never 
sell. So, in order for this product to be profitable and be able to be sold, you have 
an externalization, a process of shifting the costs of producing a McDonald’s 
burger to people who are not compensated, of course, for the damage they receive, 
and in the end this makes the McDonald’s burger cost one dollar and not 150. 
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Lastly, I would say that the key difference of ecological economics is that rather 
than thinking in terms of one value – in theoretical terms, utility, or in practical 
terms, money, which is then used to make cost-benefit assessments and compare 
one possible option like cutting down the forest or leaving the forest, and then 
do a cost-benefit assessment in terms of money – in ecological economics we say 
that there are different values and that these different values are not necessarily 
commensurable. So a forest has a value in terms of its sanctity, in terms of the 
pleasure that it gives to people, in terms of its history, in terms of its culture, also 
in terms of the revenue it produces for tourism more than for logging, but also 
in terms of the uncountable intrinsic values it provides for ecosystems. All these 
different values are incommensurable on the one hand, but on the other hand 
they can be compared. Joan Martínez Alier wrote a very interesting paper arguing 
about the scant comparability of these values. So we have a culturally sacred 
forest and a forest that produces timber. It’s not the market that will resolve what 
to do; instead, there are institutions that can compare these values and meet to 
find a solution. 
With this in mind, let me just jump straight ahead with a graph, because I’m 
talking to an economist audience and I’m going to use a lot of graphs today. I hope 
I won’t tire the rest of you; they are simple graphs. This is the simplest graph you 
can get about environmental demands – it deals with carbon emissions and global 
GDP. And of course what you see is this almost parallel one-to-one relationship, 
one following the other. The only times when global carbon emissions fell were 
during the major recessions, when the Soviet Union collapsed, etc. 
The link between the scale of the economy and carbon emissions at the global 
level is as close to a statistically significant relationship as it gets in economics. And 
that’s not just for carbon emissions: it’s for any type of environmental damage, 
material flows etc., at the global scale. Why do I insist on the global scale? Because 
on the local scale or the national scale, you have distortions because of trade, 
so carbon emissions might stabilise in Spain but this is because emissions are 
imported from China, so then you have accounting problems. But if you take it 
at the global scale you find this very strong one-to-one relationship. The economy 
we see in ecological economics is fundamentally material and fundamentally 
produces waste, so for an ecological economist this is not a surprise. Of course, in 
the Paris Convention, in the dominant discourse, the idea is that we can separate 
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these two lines, the so-called decoupling or dematerialization or decarbonisation. 
The idea is that you can have global GDP – the red line – going up, and the blue 
line suddenly goes down, and you have an X. I like to joke about that and say, 
«Okay, yes, that may be theoretically possible – I can’t prove it’s wrong». But if 
that’s the case, there is no basis in economics to talk about empirical regularities, 
because you might argue yes, in the past there were empirical regularities. In the 
future we are going to separate them, they’re not going to exist any more. In this 
type of discourse you can talk forever: maybe it’s possible or maybe it’s not possible. 
What I want to emphasize here is that the data show that at least, at the minimum, 
it’s very, very hard to separate these two. Those of you who are econometricians 
do panel data analysis and take many countries, carbon emissions, different 
factors, renewable energy regulations and oil prices and you add in whether or 
not the economy is contracting, and then you find that the single factor that most 
accurately, strongly and decisively predicts a decrease in carbon emissions is the 
contraction of the economy. There’s no question about this fact. So then we can 
argue that we hope we can have growth – not in my case, however, but there are 
people who hope that we can have growth and reduce carbon emissions, and it’s 
good to have hope, but are these hopes realistic? I would say they’re not.
So this brings me to the degrowth hypothesis, on which I’m going to elaborate. 
Three points: «green» dematerialized growth is implausible – which is what I 
was just saying but now I’m going to flesh out the argument a little. The idea of 
green growth, of continuing to grow at the same time as global environmental 
conditions improve, I call «implausible» because I do not want to call it impossible 
since I haven’t found the equation to prove it’s impossible. Let’s just say I think it’s 
implausible. 
The second point I’m going to make is that growth has become uneconomic in 
what Herman Daly calls the over-developed world and the global North. Herman 
Daly calls it over-developed in the sense that we use much more than our fair 
share of the planet’s resources, and that growth in our part of the world is no 
longer possible, even if some benefits are obtained that derive at lower levels of 
development. 
And thirdly, a more controversial and more difficult point: I’m going to 
provide some insights to show that it is possible to prosper without growth or 
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with growth. Or again I might say it’s plausible, rather than possible, since those 
possibilities are different, but I would say it’s quite plausible. This material comes 
from a book we published last year, with my co-editors here, Giacomo D’Alisa 
and Federico Demaria, of course, sitting in the audience. It’s a published volume 
with fifty chapters, translated into ten languages including Catalan. 
My presentation today is very partial because growth is a much broader 
and more interdisciplinary topic bringing together feminists, economists and 
economic anthropologists; we talk about the economy of care, we talk about 
the commons and about how people who come from political philosophy are 
critical of ideas of development. I’m not going to touch on any of this today 
because I want to focus a little bit on the more economic – or economistic, you 
might call it – discourse that stems from this book, and this is only one of the 
threads of this debate. 
So for those of you who are economists, I might be less of an economist 
than you would like. Those of you who are more closely connected – shall we 
say – with the degrowth world, might think I’m more of an economist than 
you would like but that’s the price of being interdisciplinary. We’re somewhere 
in between, trying to combine different fields.
So I’m going to present the three arguments by means of three groups of slides 
of graphs. The first three graphs are going to be about the first argument and so 
on. Allow me to start with the first three visuals. The first ones are an argument 
against green growth. The debate about limits to growth is very old, some of you 
might say, and it’s ground zero for De Salvo. For those of you who lived in the 
seventies, I hear it was a much more lively debate than it is now.
Yes, and then Solo supposedly demolished them – although  at least for us 
ecological economists he didn’t do anything of the sort, despite his claims –  and 
Paul Krugman claims today that his teacher demolished Midas. The fact is that 
he didn’t demolish him but he did provide some arguments which are sound, 
in my opinion, even if  they don’t hold. One of the first arguments that Solo 
posited against is the idea of Midas which states that there are limits to growth. 
He says yes, there might be limits and then as the economy’s scale grows, it 
consumes more materials and emits more, and there are more carbon emissions. 
But he goes on to add: «Faced with these technological problems, progress would 
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become more efficient, so we might consume fewer resources per unit of GDP 
and this could more than compensate the increase in the scale of the economy, 
and the overall use of resources or emissions would decrease because we would 
become much more efficient, i.e. a car today emits much less carbon than a 
car thirty years ago, and the economy is more efficient per unit of whatever 
product it delivers. This makes sense, but then, what doesn’t make sense from 
this perspective is this picture here, which is quite characteristic. The red line is 
China and it’s more or less the same pattern for the US, but less pronounced, 
while for China you can see it very clearly. Here you see, for China [referring to a 
graph], that the strong line is the efficiency of the economy, its carbon intensity, 
that’s the red line: the strong line is total carbon emissions for China, right? 
And you see it going up as you would expect. The other line, the broken line, is 
the efficiency of China’s economy in terms of carbon, that is to say, how much 
carbon it uses for each unit of GDP product. And this goes down, so the Chinese 
economy becomes much more efficient as it advances technologically, as Solo 
predicted. But its carbon emissions rise dramatically. Why does this happen? You 
might argue that it’s because of a scant adoption of technologies, etc. But, no, an 
ecological economist would suggest here a more structural relationship between 
efficiency and scale, even though these are not just independent variables. Our 
starting point is what we call Jevons’ paradox, from John Stanley Jevons who 
wrote about it in The Coal Question back in the 19th century, when the steam 
engine – which used coal – was invented. Jevons noted the obvious fact that 
steam engines were much more efficient in terms of how much coal they used, 
but the result was that we started using more coal. Why was that? Because the 
efficient steam engines reduced the prices of coal and then many new uses for coal 
emerged, and we started extracting more coal. So, as we became more efficient, 
we used more resources, and the fact that there is a causal relationship between 
these two is not an accident. That is nothing surprising. What surprises me is that 
economists often make a distinction. When it comes to labour productivity, no 
economist will argue that by becoming more productive the number of workers 
will decrease. No, the idea is: «Yes, we can employ more workers because the 
economy grows as a result of labour productivity». It’s exactly the same thing 
with energy productivity, or energy efficiency. The more efficient and productive 
an economy becomes, the more it grows and the more energy resources it uses 
and that’s precisely what growth is about. It’s about becoming more productive, 
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obtaining resources, investing them and growing. So here is the fundamental 
link between efficiency and the growth of carbon emissions, and any other type 
of material resource users damage. It’s not easy just to say: «Here are the numbers 
and now we can become ten times more efficient. If the economy grows only 
twofold, then we are going to use five times less resources». But no, it’s not like 
that. If we become ten times more efficient, we’re probably going to grow by 
fifteen. 
The second argument is against the idea of how economies can materialise. 
You might have heard about the weightless economy, the material economy, 
especially from Silicon Valley. People who work at Facebook etc. think that 
because they are materialised and because they produce a lot of money, this can 
be generalised to the economy as a whole. So they say: «Ok, me and my keyboard 
produce one billion dollars’ worth of stock». But unless you take Facebook or 
Google, this cannot be generalised, obviously: there is not an economic – or let’s 
say theoretical foundation – to claim that. There was a debate recently regarding 
the OECD and the more developed economies’ «material use» coming to a 
peak. So some people talked about «peak consumption» and said: «We use fewer 
materials, we’ve used all the cars that we wanted, we’ve done that and now we 
use more immaterial services, so now we prefer to use our WhatsApps and send 
stupid messages to one another, right?»
And there was some evidence to support this. The evidence was that, if you 
observe the red line, domestic material consumption, the total amount of 
materials domestically extracted or imported into a country, such as the amount 
of copper, silver, iron –materials that Spain or Catalonia extract domestically or 
import from elsewhere in the world– to maintain production, would show a 
kind of plateauing for most OECD countries while the GDP increases. So people 
said: «OK, there is peak material consumption and we are dematerialising, we’re 
becoming service economies». But then some people very reasonably said: «Yes, 
but what about materials that we are not using directly for production in Spain 
or Catalonia, but that we import because other people produce the product that 
we used to be producing? They produce an amount of products which we import 
here so that we can be service workers. How do we account for that?» The clever 
way to account for that was to use a material footprint indicator. So, what you 
do is take all the products consumed within the borders of Catalonia and then 
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ask: «How much material was produced in order to produce this product that we 
consumed in Catalonia?» This is called the material footprint of the economy of 
Catalonia. You calculate this in this way, and then what you find is once again 
the same straight line that I talked about before: an almost one-to-one relationship 
between the material footprint of OECD countries – the more advanced 
economies that are supposedly dematerialising – and the scale of their economy 
– their GDP. So there’s no dematerialisation. I call it «the paradox». Why should 
I call it the paradox? Because all economists are predicting that this should and 
would happen, but I say: «Ok, then why is it not happening? Why is no one 
trying to explain it in any other way than how we ecological economists explain 
it, with our rough description of how economies materialise?». Of course, this 
cannot be proven. People can tell you: «No, the economy is not just material – 
it’s also information, it’s communication». Ok, then, if it’s information and 
communication we havve gone through the most important information and 
communication revolution of all times. Eighty percent of our economies are 
services. How is it then that they are still so materially intensive? Why haven’t 
they dematerialised? After all the fundamental economic transformation that has 
taken place the last thirty years? Of course, someone might argue that certain 
products, or certain materials, or certain forms of producing energy, can be 
substituted for less damaging ones. So you might argue, and I think it’s a 
reasonable argument, that we could indeed shift from fossil-fuel producing 
energy technologies to renewable technologies. But that’s just a shift, it’s a 
substitution. There is no a priori reason why this would be impossible, right? 
And I agree that it is possible to shift from fossil fuels to renewable ones. What I 
would beg to doubt, however, is this: with a shift from fossil-fuelled energies to 
renewable energies, would we be able to maintain the current scale of the 
economy, the global economy, or if you prefer, the OECD economy? And the 
current patterns of expected rates of growth? Only two or three percent per year 
means a doubling of the economy every twenty-five to thirty-five years. And why 
would I question this? Because people like Paul Krugman say that we can have 
both a transition to renewable energies and also stimulate the economy to grow. 
We spent money with the Green New Deal on infrastructures, on highways, on 
trains, and the economy started growing, and we can do the same now by 
investing on renewable energies. This might make sense in the short term. Yes, if 
you have a lack of demand., etc, yes, it’s good to have public investments in these 
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types of activities. But can this produce the type of growth that was produced in 
the 1930s, 40s or 50s, on the back of an incredible, unique and unprecedented 
source of net energy – fossil fuels? There are people and economists like Charles 
Hole who have tried to calculate how much net energy – or EROI as they call it, 
energy return on investment – different types of energy sources produce. How 
much energy do you use to extract energy? And this is what they found. This is 
an old graph but their estimation is similar. It’s a paper from 2010 but the graph 
is from 1986 and the picture is the same. They say that in the case of oil, for 
example, in the 1930s, for one unit of energy you put in, you would take out a 
hundred units of energy. For oil, in the 1990s, from one unit that you put in you 
get twenty units of oil out, which is much less net energy . It is now much less 
than that –about five to ten units or in the best-case scenario fifteen or twenty, 
with technological progress. So, the question here is, for an ecological economist 
who thinks that net energy matters for this scale of economic growth  (for 
mainstream economists, energy doesn’t enter even in the production function, 
so, it wouldn’t make such a big difference)  but from an ecological economist 
perspective we say labour productivity essentially occurs because of the use of oil. 
Oil did a lot of work. Think of energy slaves. If you had to use people to pull 
elevators up, you would need a lot of people, right? We are much more labour-
productive because petroleum and electricity pull the elevator up. So, the 
question is: If our energy sources have much less net energy, will we be able to 
maintain the same scale of the economy, the same growth rates? The answer from 
a growth perspective is «no». It’s very unlikely. It hasn’t been proven but it seems 
unlikely and I think this merits more research. Growth has become economic: 
we’ll look at two slides on this. These are standard slides and they won’t be a 
surprise to you, but there are two ways to measure welfare, independently of 
GDP. The first one is to measure it objectively, as objectively as you can – and 
some have developed the index for sustainable economic welfare. San Francisco 
is the site of the real product think-tank, which has developed the genuine 
progress indicator – where they try to put together different indicators in different 
values, not commensurable values, instead of having just one single factor against 
GDP – and you try to evaluate welfare objectively without regard to the GDP. 
This figure is for Finland but the same picture emerges for many other advanced 
economies, so what you see is that after the 1980s, the GDP increases and 
sustainable economic welfare or progress indicators decrease or stay the same. So 
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some people have told me: «That doesn’t prove that growth doesn’t work – it just 
proves that Neoliberalism, Thatcher and Reagan don’t work». And there is also 
evidence that wages stagnated after this period so while the GDP went up, 
average wages were at a standstill. So yes, this is a question: did stagnation and 
the drop in progress or welfare, or however we define it, occur because wages 
stagnated, because of redistribution to the one per cent? Or is it because at certain 
levels of growth you cannot maintain the same level of increase of wealth and 
thus welfare? Herman Daly argues the latter and says: «With more growth you 
have more environmental damage and more social cost». So at some point, he 
argues, growth becomes uneconomic. That means it’s no longer economic 
growth, it’s uneconomic growth. Now, you might also measure the welfare effect 
subjectively: you could measure it by asking people how happy they are. There 
are two camps regarding this in literature, but I don’t want to go into too much 
detail. There are people who say that over time, even if income increases in the 
country, the number of people who state that they are very happy stays the same. 
And there are good reasons for that. First of all, our preferences adapt to what we 
have. Imagine the first people who flew in an airplane and compare them with us 
who are bored with flying now...we’re no longer excited about flying in an 
airplane. So we adjust – that’s one reason. The other reason is that our satisfaction 
with life is often comparable. We compare how well we are doing to how well 
others are doing. And if society becomes more unequal and more positional, 
then even if the economy grows, people are still on the same level or less happy. 
So it does not make a difference. There is another camp as always that uses 
different indicators and different types of samples and statistical analysis, claiming 
that happiness does increase with growth.  I don’t want to go into the details but 
I do want to touch on these two questions again: namely, that growth does not 
necessarily go together with welfare and that the econometric of happiness figures 
shows that other features, such as social capital, employment and equality, 
correlate with subjective well-being and with happiness – people’s self-reported 
happiness. And I would say that this makes sense. That is to say, the more an 
economy grows, the more we would theoretically expect the returns on happiness 
or well-being or welfare to be marginal. To progress from not being able to fulfil 
your basic needs to being able to do so is  a huge improvement in your welfare; 
but going from an iPhone 3 to a 4 is probably not such a big change. This graph 
is from a recent paper – well, not so recent, from three years ago: it was on nature 
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climate change, by Julia Stumberger and colleagues. What it shows, once again, 
with some basic statistical analysis, is that you can have sustainable levels of 
development. So basically this plots life expectancy – or you can plot other 
indicators of human development – against carbon emissions. What it shows is 
that there is a window within which you can have countries that have good levels 
of development, human development, in terms of life expectancy for example – 
life expectancy in the range of an average of eighty years, which is also the OECD 
and rich countries’ average – at very low and sustainable levels of carbon emissions. 
The colour makes this graph three dimensional, so the colours show countries’ 
income. You have high-income countries, which do not have significantly better 
results in terms of human development, but they have much more carbon 
emissions. So this again reframes a little bit the idea of development, where 
development is always aimed at reaching the top, supposedly to be like the US 
economy. No, this graph is arguing that there might be options that can both 
improve human development and be sustainable from a carbon perspective, but 
they are not models based on the US or the wealthier countries. They are models 
with a more medium range of income. Now the countries that I see here are not 
all great examples. I see Albania, Sri Lanka, Nicaragua, and I see countries that 
have problematic governments, histories and conditions. So it’s a simplistic 
argument to say that they have found some secret. But you do have some 
countries like Costa Rica and Uruguay, countries that, you could argue, have 
managed to combine sufficient levels of well-being with low levels of environmental 
impact. So, why don’t we call them developed countries and see what they are 
doing and try to imitate them? It would thus be possible to prosper without 
growth. Here I have a few slides. I’m at the 35-minute point and I think I should 
conclude at 50 minutes. So I have 15 minutes left for three more slides, plus a 
broader conclusion. I would also like to have some time for discussion. 
One of the key concerns is that, within a capitalist economy, when you do not 
have growth you have all sorts of problems, and, of course, no one can be 
oblivious to that. If someone denies that fact then they think that recession or 
contraction are good, and are completely naive, so no one who is arguing for 
growth is arguing for that. The arguments for growth are: Let’s first agree that 
there the economy cannot continue to grow like that ecologically and sustainably 
and then let’s discuss the alternatives. Let’s open up the range of the alternatives. 
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I’m from Greece and I know that the recession has a very ugly face, but is it 
necessary? Is it necessary under all types of institutional conditions, under all 
types of politics, under all types of international agreements? Do you have to 
have these results when there is a recession or a contraction of the economy? 
Again, I would question this. I don’t think it is a necessary condition. And the 
range of changes you might have from one type of capitalist free-market economy 
to a social-democratic or socialist type of economy, vary enormously, and the 
range of institutional alternatives that may create very different outcomes during 
those recessions is very wide. This is just a simple graph to show that, and it is 
from the IMF, which was not arguing this point at all. It was talking about 
Okun’s law, the relationship between employment and unemployment and 
growth: so, one-percent growth leads to a one-percent increase in the employment 
rate. This would be a one-to-one relationship. What this graph shows is the effect 
of a one-percent change in output on the unemployment rate, for different 
countries. What you see is that, unfortunately, we live in the only country where 
a decrease in the growth rate results in a one-percent increase in the unemployment 
rate, or if you prefer: a ten-percent decrease in the growth rate means a ten-
percent increase in the unemployment rate. But then you go to the other extreme 
and you see countries like Japan or Austria, where a ten-point decrease in GDP 
results in a one-point increase in the unemployment rate, so there’s huge variety 
within the different contraction and unemployment relationships. What does 
this mean? I’m not sure what it means. I’m perplexed that the IMF report doesn’t 
focus at all on this point and isn’t interested in addressing this question. Would 
it be possible to have high employment without economic growth, or with 
economic contraction? They don’t ask this question. The interesting question 
would be why it is different in Japan: how has Japan had twenty or thirty years 
of basically no growth and still have an unemployment rate of three to four 
percent. I ask my Japanese friends over dinner or lunch but that’s not serious 
research. You might hear about the way Japanese companies treat their workers, 
its labour regulations, social support and the safety net that exists there, etc. I’m 
not saying that Japan is doing something miraculous. But I am saying that there 
are important institutional differences. Not least in terms of labour regulation – 
labour market regulation might make a huge difference in the relationship 
between growth and unemployment. For ecological economists and those who 
study growth, that’s a key question. Tim Jackson, who wrote a very interesting 
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book– translated by the publisher Icaria – called Prosperity Without Growth, 
argued that if we don’t have growth, a way of reducing unemployment would be 
to share work and reduce working hours. That’s an old argument. The 
counterargument by economists is that this would increase the cost of labour and 
would affect profits. I carried out a literature review on this with Nicholas 
Ashford, who is an environmental policy scholar at MIT. What we found is that 
there is once again a much more complicated relationship which depends on the 
institutional conditions, etc. But, in most cases, reducing working hours creates 
more employment and that’s actually how the United States created more 
employment without growth in the thirties during the New Deal, by reducing 
working hours without reducing wages or at least without directly decreasing 
them. Other ecological economists are talking about the idea of a basic income, 
a minimum guaranteed income for everyone as a percent of GDP. There are 
people here in Catalonia who are doing very interesting studies in which they are 
trying to quantify what sort of basic income would be sustainable, which would 
be paid by the public revenue and by the tax system, without a major overhaul of 
the tax system. There, the idea is not to create employment, but to make sure that 
if our economy creates more unemployment, then there is a safety net, since this 
may happen in the future due to increasing labour productivity. I’m critical of 
that because of the energy factor, but in any case if there is more unemployment 
because of energy or because of increasing labour productivity, then at least out 
of the common pool we create a minimum safety net for everyone with this basic 
income. So here we have a kind of re-thinking or re-inventing of the welfare 
state. A strong argument against the idea that the economy can be downscaled or 
contracted and not cause a huge problem – and this notion came through very 
strongly in the book by Thomas Piketty – is that in periods of low growth we 
have sky-rocketing inequalities. So Piketty argued - the only peak, where we had 
very low inequality and as you see here we have income inequality, but you can 
have capital or wealth inequality, etc.  This is from the 1940s to the 1980s for the 
US. It was a period of very high growth – a period of unprecedented growth of 
four to five percent. Piketty gave a rule of thumb when he said: «How much 
inequality you have depends in part on how much the growth rate compares to 
the rate of the trend to capital». So if the rate of the trend to capital is three 
percent and the growth rate is five percent, less of the total product goes to the 
capitalists, the ones who have capital in their hands. But if you have a three-
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percent return to capital and a zero-percent growth rate, this means that more 
money will be put in the hands of those who already hold capital and you have 
increasing inequalities. This might make sense but then if you start unpacking 
this argument it becomes problematic. For example, how can you always have a 
three-percent return on capital if you don’t have any growth? At some point this 
will have to reach a limit. Piketty uses some historical data. He says: «Look, I read 
some novels and in 19th-century France people received a five-per cent return on 
estates and their economies were stagnant, so this can happen.» It probably can 
happen but what’s the economic logic behind it? Daron Acemoglu, who is one of 
the most famous neoclassical mainstream economists now, did the basic 
econometric test and he didn’t find any correlation between this difference, 
between RNG and inequalities. And we know that inequalities increase, even 
with growth, in countries with growth, so we know that within countries growth, 
especially over the last thirty years, has come with an increase of inequalities. So 
during the period of 1990-2000, the US had quite high growth rates, but this 
didn’t mean that inequalities didn’t increase. And of course, the second reading 
one can make of Piketty is that what matters is not so much growth but the 
institutional and political conditions. Again, it’s the conditions under which you 
tax wealth and how you tax income that make the difference for inequalities. So, 
from the 1940s to the 1980s there were extraordinary – for our levels, but not for 
that period – rates of taxation on the highest incomes... almost 95%. When we 
read that now, we can hardly believe it. Now the rates are 30% but they started 
decreasing to this figure in the 1980s, I mean, this is quite a recent development. 
So there was a very different institutional setup that has secured inequality, and 
this is not related to growth or lack of growth but has to do with political 
determination. It has to do with strong labour movements and trade unions at 
the time, and some might argue that with the Cold War the Americans were 
afraid that if they did not give enough to their workers, then the Russians would 
win their hearts. So, they would give and they would tax more, and the rich were 
maybe even more willing to be taxed because they knew there was a danger. So, 
there are all these factors that determine the level of inequality rather than growth 
per se. And if you see the huge slump in the inequality rates there, the inconvenient 
truth, as you might call it, is that the source was the war: it was total destruction, 
the worst destruction that we ever saw, that redistributed wealth. It is a sad 
conclusion that the capital system doesn’t redistribute automatically, except 
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during periods of destruction, and that’s a scary conclusion but it’s one that is 
obvious from the data. It’s 1941 and inequality decreases. And there was no 
growth during this period. 
So, I come to my last point. Firstly, if we want to argue against the idea that 
growth is necessary for prosperity, we first have to see that growth is a quite 
recent phenomenon. As a concept, it was basically invented in the 1950s, believe 
it or not. So economists of course would be concerned with the wealth of nations, 
Adam Smith, etc., but they did not talk about growth; growth is a concept that 
appears mostly in the 1950s with Keynes and his colleagues, and Kuznets, the 
measuring of GDP, etc. We didn’t talk about growth before that. Growth as a 
material phenomenon is quite recent:  it started at the global level in the mid-
19th century with the Industrial Revolution and capitalism. So it’s a phenomenon 
that goes hand-in-hand with capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. First, we 
have to establish whether capitalist societies or so-called socialist societies... 
industrial societies, are the only ones that have prospects in human history? I 
would say no. I come from Greece and we are taught from primary school that 
our ancestors were quite prosperous and that growth didn’t exist as a concept. 
They didn’t measure how their economy was doing: we don’t know if it was 
growing or not but it was quite prosperous. Then, more people lived on the 
Greek islands than now. So, the economy was organised in such a way that it 
provided for the people. It was prosperous, not necessarily growing and definitely 
hundreds of times smaller than the current economy. So, it’s not the only time 
we have had prosperity, but definitely the only time that we have had sustained 
growth at that level, growth both of population and of economic output. But is 
this growth sustainable? And I wouldn’t only emphasise here the ecological 
dimension – because I think we can argue forever whether and when limits to 
growth will appear from an ecological perspective – but I think climate change is 
actually a very strong factor that we cannot overlook now. The limits to growth 
first reported in the 1970s, I think, made a different point, which has been 
overlooked. They made the point that any type of geometric growth in the long 
term is unsustainable. And this is mathematically unsustainable. If you have 
something that grows at three percent a year, which is a healthy growth rate, it 
means it doubles every twenty-five years, seventy divided by three more or less, 
right? So this doubles, doubles and doubles. So from one, it becomes two, then 
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four, then eight. The limits to growth start with these examples. They say imagine 
this: you have a lake and the plankton doubles every ten or twenty years. Sadly, 
at some point half your lake is full and the following year it doubles, so that’s the 
end of things. These doubles get bigger and they are harder to sustain. For 
ecological reasons, or as political economists such as David Harvey argue, due to 
the difficulty of finding investment outlets and creating a huge demand for this 
ever-growing economy that doubles every twenty-five years from an already large 
size, creating more demand, more investments, more infrastructures gets harder 
and harder. Ecological economists are the only ones who talk about stagnation. 
But as people say, «we predicted all thirty of the last two periods of stagnation». 
We over-predict stagnation but at least we are the only ones who talk and predict 
stagnation. The discussion about secular stagnation has now gone mainstream, 
however, so you have Lawrence Summers talking about secular stagnation, you 
have Paul Krugman talking about stagnation, you have new books like Robert 
Gordon’s saying that the era of growth is over, and of course you have Piketty 
who says the same thing. He says that over the next hundred years growth rates 
are going to be at best zero to one percent as they have been for most of human 
history. They were only at three to four percent after the worst catastrophic 
period we ever had, which was the Second World War. So growth will be zero to 
one percent. Stagnation is coming. The question is: what next? What happens 
then? And Piketty’s book opened this debate. Are we going to become a neo-
patrimonial type of society? Or can we create something that is equal, a society 
that is equal within this new condition of stagnation? You might call them 
Malthusian now. And you may say Malthus was the first one who said stagnation 
was coming, but this was three hundred years ago and he was proven wrong. I 
would reply: «Ok, even if he was proven wrong three hundred years ago, this 
doesn’t mean he would be wrong forever» and even Robert Solow accepts that, 
saying: «Yes, it doesn’t mean anything if we didn’t have stagnation when it was 
first predicted, it might come later.» More interestingly - I’m currently researching 
economic history and I’m reading Malthus – Malthus did not predict stagnation, 
he was actually an advocate of growth. This might sound a little bit controversial 
but this is what my new work is trying to put forward: he was actually advocating 
for growth of food in order to accommodate for growth of population. What he 
couldn’t see, and for him growth was just growth of population, is that you can 
have growth in food consumption per capital, so not all growth of food is to 
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simply feed people, some of it could go also to other things. But Malthus, if you 
read him closely, was zero sceptical of stagnation and zero critical of the prospects 
of economic growth. And this makes sense: he was actually the first professional 
political economist, the first person to hold the chair of political economy, and it 
would be very strange if he was criticising the core concept of the discipline at 
the time, which was the idea of the wealth of nations. So he was also concerned 
as everyone was with the wealth of nations, and he believed that it can grow 
indefinitely to new levels. But what I’m saying is that people who might call 
themselves Malthusians today – even though I would say they’re very different 
from Malthus then – or environmentalists argue that even if growth were to be 
sustainable – and forget Picketty’s or Laura Summer's questions about secular 
stagnation –it is becoming destructive for the climate and life on the planet. And 
that’s a whole new type of situation, different from the context in Malthus’ time 
or the 18th century. So, we have an economic growth that is damaging. I don’t 
care if damage undermines the conditions for economic growth itself. We might 
think of an extreme scenario in which this catastrophe of climate change may be 
good for growth, like the Second World War was good for growth. But is this 
something to look forward to? Is this type of human development and trajectory 
aspirational? I believe it is not. And I will conclude by saying that although very 
often it is argued that ecological economists or people who write about limits to 
growth are pessimists, supposedly, and those who believe that growth can 
continue forever and that new technologies and nuclear energy will result in 
clean energy that can power forever a growing economy are optimists, I would 
say the opposite: the latter are the pessimists. They are the pessimists and I would 
say that they are negative because they are the ones who cannot think out of the 
box as to how society itself can innovate and come together to solve collective 
problems, problems like climate change and environmental degradation. I would 
say that the history of human progress and of human development has not been 
just one of technological progress... there have been two forces at play: 
technological development on the one hand, which has been very destructive, 
and on the other hand, social progress – the feminist movement, the labour 
movement, people coming together and changing things, interacting and creating 
systems that are more different than anyone could have ever imagined in the 
18th century. If you read Malthus now, you will see that he could not have 
imagined the gender relationships we have today. It is this type of innovation 
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that I think is necessary. And it is this type of innovation that people who are 
critical of growth and positive about the limits of growth and about our capacity 
to change in the face of potential disaster are optimistic about. Thank you.
